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Self-Defense and Objectivity:
A Reply to Judith Jarvis Thomson
Russell Christopher *
In Self-Defense,1 Judith Jarvis Thomson sets out a the-
ory of self-defense rendering permissible the use of defen-
sive force against both culpable aggressors and morally in-
nocent threats, but not against bystanders. The ostensible
purpose of Thomson's theory, and that which has attracted
the most criticism,2 is justifying (not merely excusing) force
against morally and juridically innocent, but causally
harmful, threats. Thomson adopts a rights-based version of
moral forfeiture which utilizes an objective perspective.
* Research Scholar in the Faculty of Law, Columbia University School of
Law. I wish to thank Anthony Dillof, George Fletcher, Kent Greenawalt, Maria
Pagano and Joseph Raz for their criticisms of an earlier draft of this article.
1. Judith Jarvis Thomson, Self-Defense, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283 (1991)
[hereinafter Self-Defense].
2. See Larry Alexander, Self-Defense, Justification, and Excuse, 22 PHIL &
PUB. AFF. 53 (1993); Jeff McMahan, Self-Defense and the Problem of the Innocent
Attacker, 104 ETHICS 252 (1994); Michael Otsuka, Killing the Innocent in Self-
Defense, 23 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 74 (1994).
3. My use of the term 'objective,' and later in the paper the term 'subjective,'
both of which are extraordinarily ambiguous, is adapted from Thomson's
distinction between the terms as found in: JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, THE REALM
OF RIGHTS 172-73 (1990) [hereinafter THE REALM OF RIGHTS]; Judith Jarvis
Thomson, Imposing Risks, in RIGHTS, RESTITUTION, AND RISK 178-79 (William
Parent ed., 1986) [hereinafter Imposing Risks]. Conduct is permissible, under an
objective approach, based on what was, is or will be the case, without regard to
any mental state of the actor. Conduct is permissible, under a subjective approach,
based on an actor's belief or knowledge of what was, is or will be the case or by
consideration of one or more mental states of an actor.
Some theories might be called objective in that they contain one or more
objective components or criteria while also utilizing subjective criteria. See, for
example, the theories discussed in section VIII. These same theories could
variably be termed partially objective or even partially subjective. For the
purposes of clarity in contrasting other theories with Thomson's theory I will term
any theory that contains at least one subjective criterion as subjective or partially
subjective.
Later I will distinguish between two possible types of objective accounts
which Thomson might be employing. I will term these the strongly and weakly
objective approaches. See infra section H.
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Although commentators have disagreed with her conclu-
sions about favoring morally and causally innocent actors
over morally innocent, but causally harmful, actors, no one
has taken issue with her underlying objective approach to
self-defense.
The doctrine of self-defense faces an intriguing concep-
tual puzzle. We conceive of permissible self-defense as a
response to a previous or the initial impermissible threat of
harm. Yet in order for force in self-defense to be successful
it must, in some cases, be employed prior to the fruition of
the threat to which it is in response. Since the force in self-
defense may actually occur prior to or prevent the actuality
of the threatened harm, the force used in self-defense may
easily resemble or be confused with the initial impermissi-
ble threat of harm from an objective perspective ignoring
the beliefs, intentions and reasons of the actors. I will argue
that Thomson's theory fails to successfully distinguish be-
tween what we intuit to be the impermissible aggression or
threat and the permissible use of self-defense in response to
the aggression or threat.
This reply to Thomson's theory of self-defense will par-
ticularly focus on the untenability of her objective account
of permissible force. I will claim that a careful analysis of
Thomson's approach yields conclusions diametrically oppo-
site to those which she claims. Her objective approach,
properly considered, not only justifies the threats posed by
morally innocent, but causally harmful actors, but also the
force used by culpable (evil) aggressors and unwittingly for-
feits the life of morally and causally innocent victims. The
seemingly most attractive revision to her theory, which
might avoid these counterintuitive results, will be shown to
result in, among other problems, a paradox in which what
is permissible becomes impermissible. I will argue that only
the inclusion of subjective criteria will make Thomson's
For general discussions of objectivity and subjectivity see KENT
GREENAWALT, LAW AND OBJECTIVITY (1992); Thomas Nagel, The Limits of
Objectivity, in 1 THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES (Sterling M.
McMurrin & Eric Asby eds., 1980).
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theory tenable. More broadly, my remarks may suggest
significant difficulties with any objective account of justifi-
able self-defense.
I.
Thomson develops and refines her account of permissible
self-defense by considering six hypothetical cases.' In Vil-
lainous Aggressor,5 a driver of a truck is trying to kill you
by running you over; you can only save your life by blowing
up the truck (and thereby killing the driver). Thomson of-
fers the argument that lethal self-defense force is permis-
sible in this instance because he is villainously aggressing
against you and that unless you kill him he will kill you.
Thomson next considers Innocent Aggressor in which the
same facts pertain except that the driver is morally blame-
less (he has been drugged). She concludes that the lack of
fault of the Innocent Aggressor is irrelevant and that self-
defense force is still permissible against him. Through this
example, Thomson revises her principle explaining self-
defense derived from the first case. Defensive force is now
permissible against both drivers because they are aggress-
ing against you and they will kill you unless you kill them.
In Innocent Threat,7 a fat man accidentally falls off a cliff
and will land on you thereby killing you. You do not have
time to move out of the way, but you do have time to shift
an awning so that he is deflected away from you, thereby
killing the fat man. That the fat man is not aggressing
against you Thomson finds irrelevant and concludes that
self-defense force is permissible against the fat man. Thom-
son further narrows her principle explaining why self-
defense force is permissible in all three cases by saying that
the person you kill will otherwise kill you.
4. Readers familiar with Thomson's theory may well choose to skip ahead to
the next section.
5. Self-Defense, supra note 1, at 283-84.
6. Id. at 284-87.
7. Id. at 287-89.
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By next considering three bystander cases,' Thomson
suggests that the principle is still incomplete. In each case,
you can save your life by killing a bystander. Yet defensive
force is impermissible against the bystanders because the
above principle will not be satisfied; it is not true that the
bystanders will otherwise kill you. In considering whether
it is always impermissible to use defensive force against
bystanders Thomson confronts the case of wartime bombing
of civilians9 (i.e., bystanders) and the Doctrine of Double
Effect."0 Although Thomson bypasses the issue of the per-
missibility of such force in wartime, she rejects the doctrine
and advances two theses:
1. The Irrelevance-of-Intention-to-Permissibility
Thesis: it is irrelevant to the question whether X
may do A what intention X would do A with if he or
she did it.
2. The Irrelevance-of-Fault-to-Permissibility Thesis:
it is irrelevant to the question whether X may do A
whether X would be at fault in doing it. "
Thomson illustrates her theses with the example of Alfred, '
who has a dying wife, and buys what he believes is poison
intending to give it to her to accelerate her death. Unbe-
knownst to Alfred, however, that which he believes is poison
is, in fact, the only existing cure for his wife's malady. Thom-
son concludes that it would be absurd to claim that because
Alfred would give it to her with a bad intention and that he
8. Id. at 289-92.
9. Id, at 292-93, 296-98.
10. Id. at 292-296. Thomson explains that:
the Doctrine of Double Effect says that we may do what will
cause a bad outcome in order to cause a good outcome if and only
if (1) the good is in appropriate proportion to the bad and (2) we
do not intend the bad outcome as our means to the good outcome.
Id. at 292.
11. Id. at 294-95.
12. Id. at 293-95.
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would be at fault that it would be impermissible for him to
give her the stuff which, in fact, will cure her.
Returning to the issue of bystanders, Thomson asserts
that "[o]ther things being equal, every person Y has a right
against X that X not kill Y."' Can Y's right be overridden?
That X is at risk of death and can only save her life by kill-
ing bystander Y does not, Thomson concludes, override Y's
right to life. This explains why bystanders cannot be killed.
Yet every person's right to life can be overridden if they are
"about to" violate another's right to life.' By being about to
violate your right to life the Villainous Aggressor, for ex-
ample, forfeits or loses his right to life. Because you can
only save your life by killing the driver and he has forfeited
his right to life, self-defense force against the driver is
permissible.
Similarly, the Innocent Aggressor and Innocent Threat
lose their right to life because they are "about to" violate
your right to life. Since you can only save your life by killing
them and they have lost their right to life, self-defense force
against them is permissible. You are not violating their
right to life because they have already lost or forfeited it by
being "about to" violate your right to life. To the initial
principle "they will otherwise kill you" Thomson adds "that
if they kill you they will violate your right that they not do
so."' The insufficiency of the initial principle Thomson
claims to demonstrate by considering whether one of the
aggressors or threats discussed above may fight back in
permissible self-defense against you.
Thomson supposes that both Alice and Villainous Ag-
gressor have antitank guns.' Alice may permissibly blow
up the aggressor's truck. May the aggressor permissibly use
his gun against Alice in self-defense? The aggressor might
claim that he had a right that Alice not kill him and that
if he did not kill Alice, Alice would kill him and violate his
13. Id. at 299.
14. Id. at 301.
15. Id at 303.
16. Id- at 304-05.
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right not to be killed. By being about to kill the aggressor,
Alice lost or forfeited her right to life and the aggressor
killing Alice would not violate her right to life. Thomson
finds the aggressor's claim absurd because the aggressor
lost his right to life by driving the truck at Alice. In other
words, since the aggressor is the first party (between Alice
and Villainous Aggressor) to be about to violate the other's
right to life Villainous Aggressor is the one that forfeits his
right to life. Any force that Alice uses against Villainous
Aggressor is permissible since the aggressor has already
lost his right to life. Alice's force does not violate the ag-
gressor's right to life and thus does not trigger the loss of
her own right to life. Consequently, force used by the ag-
gressor against Alice's force does violate Alice's right to life
and is thereby impermissible.
Under Thomson's unrevised principle of "they will oth-
erwise kill you," however, the aggressor's force would be
permissible against Alice's force. The aggressor could prop-
erly claim that Alice would otherwise kill him. Under the
revised principle of "they will otherwise kill you and that if
they kill you they will violate your right that they not do
so," Thomson claims that the aggressor's force is "obviously
impermissible.""
In section IV, I will argue that Thomson's approach can
be shown to yield the opposite conclusion. It is the aggres-
sor's force (e.g., Villainous Aggressor's) which is permissible
and it is the defender's (e.g., Alice's) force which is imper-
missible. The Villainous Aggressor's "absurd" claim of
permissible self-defense against Alice will be shown, under
Thomson's objective theory, to be valid. Before I make a
case for the Villainous Aggressor's claim, I will next briefly
contrast objective from subjective theories and explicate
Thomson's particular form of objective approach.
17. Id. at 304.
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II.
Thomson appears to employ what might be termed a
strongly objective account of permissible self-defense. An
actor's force neither loses permissibility because of a bad
intention nor gains permissibility because of a good inten-
tion. According to Thomson's theses, discussed above, the
fault, intention or belief of an actor in using force is simply
irrelevant to the permissibility of her conduct. Thus the
husband's intention to poison his wife (with a substance
that unbeknownst to him will save her life) or his belief
that he is giving her poison does not bar the permissibility
of his act. Similarly, if the husband had intended to give his
wife what he thought was a cure, but was in fact poison, the
husband's good intention would not make his conduct per-
missible or justified. The permissibility of the husband's act
depends not on what his intentions are or what he believes
(even if reasonably), but what has objectively occurred and
what will, in fact, occur. Under a strongly objective theory,
either the substance is a poison (making his conduct im-
permissible) or the substance is a cure (making his conduct
permissible).
Applying this approach to self-defense, an actor's defen-
sive force is eligible to be justified if she is, in fact, about to
be harmed and if defensive force is, in fact, necessary. The
appearance or reasonable belief of harm is insufficient. Just
as the indication, appearance or reasonable belief that the
substance was a cure would not make the husband's act
permissible if the substance was, in fact, poison, so also the
appearance or reasonable belief that an actor is about to be
killed does not trigger permissible self-defense force if the
apparent attack was not, in fact, about to occur. Further-
more, the lack of an appearance, indication or reasonable
belief that an actor is about to be harmed is irrelevant if, in
fact, the actor is about to be harmed and force in self-
defense is, in fact, necessary. Just as the lack of appear-
ance, indication or reasonable belief that the substance was
a poison would not make the husband's act permissible if
1998] 543
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the substance was, in fact, poison, so also the lack of ap-
pearance, indication or reasonable belief both that an actor
is about to be killed and that self-defense by the actor is
necessary does not prevent self-defense force from being
permissible if the non-apparent attack was, in fact, about to
occur and self-defense was, in fact, necessary.
In assessing the permissibility of an actor's conduct, the
actor's conduct is not viewed from the actor's perspective
but from God's or an omniscient being's eye view (an ideal
observer) i.e., what actually occurred or what would have
occurred. In determining which actor's force in a physical
conflict is permissible or justified in self-defense, the cen-
tral issue is which party was, in fact, the first to be about to
use force i.e., the first to violate another's right to life.18
The strongly objective account discussed above should be
contrasted with what I shall term the weakly objective the-
ory. The weakly objective theory determines the permissi-
bility of conduct based on probability. Thomson develops
this approach in two previous works." Conduct is imper-
missible if there is a sufficiently high probability that some
proscribed result will occur; conduct is permissible if there
is not such a sufficiently high probability. Adapting this
approach to self-defense, A's force in self-defense against B
is permissible if there is a sufficiently high probability that
18. For further evidence of Thomson's reliance on an objective approach, see
Alexander, supra note 2, at 60 n.11:
Thomson... objects to my asserting a right not to be killed
culpably, where culpability in turn rests upon awareness that the
killing is wrongful. She argues instead that rights are reducible
to what we ought to do, and that what we ought to do does not
turn at all on our beliefs.
For Thomson's endorsement of objective moral theory and a rejection of subjective
moral theory see THE REALM OF RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 172-73, 175, 233-34, 241-
42; and Imposing Risks, supra note 3, at 179.
Although in Self-Defense, supra note 1, at 310 n.18, Thomson disavows a
portion of her discussion of self-defense in THE REALM OF RIGHTS, supra note 3, at
348-73, in regard to the permissibility of killing some to save more, she does not
disavow any of the parts of The Realm of Rights from which I cite.
19. THE REALM OF RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 170-74; Imposing Risks, supra
note 3.
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B is the first (between A and B) to be about to kill i.e., the
first to be about to violate the other's right to life.
Thomson -points out that although taking probabilities
into account entails a loss of some objectivity it nonetheless
does not involve a slide into a subjective view.' Thomson
distinguishes between objective probabilities and an
"agent's estimates of probabilities."21 By considering only
objective probabilities and not the subjective assessments of
probabilities by an actor, considering the probability of a
harm ensuing from a threat or aggressor cannot be said to
be subjective.
In Self-Defense Thomson appears to be employing the
strongly objective approach. No examples are discussed in
which the aggression or threat posed is uncertain and a
matter of probability. Thomson declares that she will "leave
open what should be said in cases in which it is not certain
that the aggressor will cause you a harm if you do not kill
him but only more or less probable that he will.' Since
Thomson leaves to the side cases of uncertain harm and the
cases I will discuss only involve certain harms, Thomson's
possible endorsement of a weakly objective theory that
takes into account probabilities should not apply. In any
event, I will assume that Thomson's theory of self-defense,
as developed in Self-Defense, is intended to be strongly ob-
jective. In section IV, I will attempt to support the claim
that Thomson's strongly objective theory of self-defense
yields radically counterintuitive results.
Both objective theories may be contrasted with various
(at least partially) subjective approaches to permissible self-
defense.' A purely subjective theory of self-defense ignores
the actual circumstances but focuses on the actors' beliefs
and intentions. For example, force used by an actor who
honestly, but mistakenly, believes he is being impermissi-
20. Imposing Risks, supra note 3, at 187.
21. THE REALM OF RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 173 n.7.
22. Self-Defense, supra note 1, at 286.
23. For a fuller discussion of various (at least partially) subjective theories,
see infra section VII.
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bly attacked is still eligible to be justified. Another common
type of subjective theory (though not purely subjective) im-
poses an objective standard on the actor's belief, not merely
requiring that it be honestly held but also that it be reason-
able. A third type requires not only an actor's belief in, or
knowledge of, the justificatory circumstances but also re-
quires that the threat be actual rather than mistakenly
perceived. A fourth type focuses not on the beliefs or inten-
tions of the actor asserting a claim of self-defense but on the
aggressor or threat. Defensive force is only permissible
against a threat or aggressor who believes or intends to act
wrongfully (a culpable or villainous aggressor or threat). To
adopt Jeff McMahan's distinction,' the first two at least
partially subjective theories may be termed "agent-
centered" in that they focus on the mental states of the de-
fender asserting a self-defense justification;' the fourth
theory may be termed "target-centered" in that it focuses on
aspects of the attacker. The third theory is both partially
agent-centered and partially target-centered since it re-
quires both an actual threat of harm by the aggressor or
threat and a particular mental state of the defender.
I.
To see how Thomson's account can yield diametrically
opposite results than what she claims let us first carefully
consider Robert Nozick's original case of the Innocent
Threat.' Innocent Threat (IT) is pushed off a cliff such that
he will land on and kill an innocent (for the purposes of
clarity we will hereafter refer to him as Vic) below. The
situation is such that the only way Vic can save his life is by
disintegrating IT with a ray gun. Under Thomson's account,
24. McMahan, supra note 2, at 268.
25. Another term which has been offered for such theories is Uagent-
perspectival." Suzanne Uniacke credits Robert Young for suggesting the term.
SUZANNE UNIAcKE, PERmissIBLE KILLING: THE SELF-DEfENSE JUSTIFCATION OF
HOMICIDE 17 n.6 (1994).
26. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 34 (1974).
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IT is the first (between IT and Vic) to be about to kill the
other and thus the first to be about to violate the other's
right to life. By being the first to be about to violate the
right to life of the other, IT forfeits his right to life. Once IT
loses his right to life, Vic's defensive force does not violate
IT's right to life and since Vic will otherwise be killed, Vic
may permissibly vaporize IT with a ray gun.
Although actor A being about to kill actor B would nor-
mally forfeit A's right to life, that would not be so if B had
already lost her right to life by already being about to kill A.
The key issue, therefore, is to determine which actor is the
first to be about to kill the other (i.e., the first to be about to
violate the other's right to life). I will argue that tinder a
strongly objective theory, the first actor (between two ac-
tors) to apply lethal force (or who would have been if not
stopped) is the first actor who is about to kill.' Thus if Vic
kills IT before IT can land on and kill Vic, which Thomson
believes Vic may permissibly do, it will be Vic who was the
first (between IT and Vic) to be about to kill the other and
Vic who is the first to be about to violate IT's right to life.
As a result, it is Vic who has already lost his right to life by
the time that IT is about to kill Vic. Thus, contrary to what
Thomson claims, IT's force is permissible and Vie's imper-
missible under Thomson's theory.
To see how this curious and seemingly counterintuitive
claim might be true let us carefully establish a timeline of
the events in Innocent Threat. Under Thomson's theory, A
does not have to actually kill B (who has a right to life) for
A's right to life to be forfeited, but merely be about to kill
B.' Were this not so, one might have to be already dead
before one could permissibly use defensive force to prevent
one's death which would be absurd. Thus Thomson properly
allows the permissibility of defensive force from the time
when another is about to kill one (who possesses a right to
life). For the purposes of establishing our timeline, let us
arbitrarily set the time period in which one is about to kill
27. I will defend this principle in Section V.
28. Self-Defense, supra note 1, at 301.
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another as ten units of time before one would actually kill
another (it could be 1, 5 or 15 units of time, seconds, frac-
tions of seconds or whatever time period Thomson might
accept). Thus, for example, starting at ten units of time be-
fore A would kill B (who has a right to life), A may be said
to be about to kill B and thus starting at that point A loses
his right to life.
The time period of ten units of time is purposefully left
indefinite' so as to be compatible with whatever time pe-
riod Thomson or the reader finds acceptable. Some contro-
versy exists regarding when defensive force may be applied
against a threat or aggression. Various standards include
when the threat or aggression is immediate, when its im-
minent, when defensive force is immediately necessary or
when its necessary.' Thomson's standard of about to pro-
vides little guidance but it may be safely assumed that
Thomson neither wishes to justify force in self-defense be-
fore the point in time that it is necessary nor so late in time
that the defensive force cannot be applied in time to prevent
the threat or aggression. The indefinite time period of ten
units should be similarly construed and should correspond
with Thomson's time period of "about to."
Suppose IT is pushed off the cliff at Time Zero (TO) and
he will land on Vic at T10 unless Vic uses defensive force
before impact at T10. Given our stipulated time period of
ten units of time, IT is about to kill Vic at TO. If IT is the
first (between IT and Vic) to be about to kill the other, IT
forfeits his right to life starting at TO. Whoever is the first
to be about to kill the other forfeits his own right to life and
is subject to permissible self-defense force from the other. If
IT is about to kill Vic at TO, when is Vic about to kill IT? If
29. By leaving the unit of time undefined, the time period often units of time
is also indefinite. Yet by stipulating the number of units of time as ten, the time
period is sufficiently quantified for the purposes of comparing when each actor in a
hypothetical may be said to be about to kill while still remaining indefinite.
30. For discussion of these standards and others see Richard Rosen, On Self-
Defense, Imminence, and Women Who Kill Their Batterers, 71 N.C. L. REV. 371
(1993); Robert Schopp et al., Battered Woman Syndrome, Expert Testimony, and
the Distinction Between Justification and Excuse, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 45 (1994).
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Vic is to save himself, which Thomson believes is permissi-
ble, Vic must use defensive force at some time before impact
(T10). Suppose Vic vaporizes IT with his ray gun at T5.
That would be within the time period of when IT is about to
kill Vic and it also saves Vic's life. Yet if Vic vaporizes IT at
T5, the time period in which Vic is about to kill IT starts at
Time Minus Five (T-5). Since Vic was about to kill IT prior
to IT being about to kill Vic (T-5 occurs prior to TO), Vic is
the first to be about to violate IT's right to life and Vic con-
sequently forfeits his right to life. IT's conduct does not
violate Vic's right to life because Vic has already forfeited it
at T-5. Since Vic will otherwise kill IT, IT killing Vic, or
being about to kill Vic, is permissible under Thomson's the-
ory of self-defense. By carefully considering the timeline,
Thomson's theory yields the opposite conclusion than which
she claimed.
I do not mean to suggest by my argument, as critics of
Thomson's theory have contended, that self-defense force
against moral innocents like IT is impermissible. I will ar-
gue that it is the strongly objective perspective underlying
Thomson's theory which is untenable. In the next section I
will demonstrate that under Thomson's theory, contrary to
Thomson's conclusion and our nearly undisputed intuitions,
self-defense force is impermissible against a villainous ag-
gressor but permissible against a moral innocent.
IV.
Let us consider the case of Villainous Aggressor, dis-
cussed above, in which a driver of a truck (hereafter VA) is
villainously trying to run over and kill an innocent (again,
for purposes of clarity let us call him Vic). The only way
that innocent Vic can save his life is by blowing up the
truck before it hits him, thereby killing VA. Thomson ex-
plains that force by Vic is permissible because VA is the
first (between VA and Vic) who is about to kill the other, by
driving the truck at him, thereby being about to violate
Vic's right to life. VA thereby loses his right to life. Force
used against VA does not violate his right to life because he
1998] 549
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has already lost it. Vic using force against VA does not for-
feit Vic's right to life because he is not violating VA's right
to life. Since VA will otherwise kill him, Vic killing VA is
permissible self-defense force.
Unlike the case of Innocent Threat, perhaps no one
would claim that self-defense force is impermissible against
a culpable aggressor such as VA. Moreover, no one would
assert that innocent Vic has forfeited his right to life and
that his defensive force is impermissible. Yet under Thom-
son's strongly objective conception of self-defense, contrary
to what she claims, it can be shown that VA's force is per-
missible in self-defense against Vie's force and that Vie's
force is impermissible. Let us again suppose that the time
period of about to kill starts at ten units of time before le-
thal force is applied. Further suppose that at TO, VA starts
to drive at Vic to kill him. Unless Vic blows up the truck,
VA will run over Vic at T10, thereby killing him. Thus
starting at TO, VA is about to kill Vic. Whether VA being
about to kill Vic at TO thereby forfeits VA's right to life de-
pends on who (between VA and Vic) is the first to be about
to kill the other. If Vic is to save his life, as Thomson and
presumably everyone else thinks is permissible, Vic must
blow up the truck and kill VA sometime between TO and
T10. If we suppose that Vic kills VA at T5, then Vic was
about to kill VA at T-5. Since Vic was the first to be about to
kill the other, Vic at T-5 is about to violate VA's right to life.
By being about to violate VA's right to life, Vic forfeits his
own right to life at T-5. VA cannot be about to violate Vie's
right to life at TO because Vic has already lost it. Force
employed by Vic is impermissible since it would violate
VA's right to life. Since Vic has already lost his right to life,
and Vic will otherwise kill VA, VA running over and killing
Vic (or at least trying to) is permissible self-defense under
Thomson's theory.
Thomson's theory, through careful attention to the
timeline, is shown to yield the opposite conclusion than
what it purports to do both in cases where Vic faces an in-
nocent threat and where he faces a villainous aggressor.
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This would seem to show that the difficulty in Thomson's
account is not justifying force against moral innocents. That
Thomson's theory can justify self-defense force by a villain-
ous aggressor against what would seem to be an innocent
faultless person is especially troubling since virtually no
one would claim that a villainous aggressor's force should
be justified in such a paradigm situation of permissible self-
defense. I will argue that the problem stems from employ-
ing a strongly objective conception of permissible self-
defense. My claim will be buttressed by showing, in section
VIII, that various (at least partially) subjective accounts of
self-defense avoid the counterintuitive results of Thomson's
theory. In the next section I will address some possible
criticisms of the method I have thus far employed.
V.
My interpretation or use of Thomson's phrase "about to"
may strike many readers as unusual or even counterintui-
tive. Many may feel one may properly speak of IT and VA
being about to use force, as Thomson uses the phrase, but
something is amiss when we say that Vic is about to use
force at the point I claim. Some may find it strange to say
that Vic is about to use force at a point when he neither in-
tended to use force nor was aware that he would use force
nor was even aware of a threat that might require defensive
force. One might claim that about to does not strictly refer
to a temporal condition or is not limited to referring to a
time period. Even if Thomson intended a strictly temporal
meaning of about to, it could be argued that her theory need
not rest on that meaning and may be easily altered without
losing any explanatory power.
Although I concede that my interpretation seems un-
usual at the outset, I will argue that it is nonetheless a
plausible and correct interpretation in light of Thomson's
theory. The extent to which it seems strange may attest to
the enduring appeal of a subjective conception of self-
defense, even to those who favor a strongly objective ac-
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count. I assert that my interpretation of about to is entailed
by a strongly objective conception of justification, but is in-
compatible with a subjective view. The absurd conse-
quences (justifying self-defense force by VA and forfeiting
the life of innocent Vic) derived from Thomson's theory may
only be satisfactorily avoided, I will argue, by adopting
some form of subjective approach.
A strongly objective view focuses not on the intentions,
beliefs or perceptions of any of the agents involved but is
concerned with what, in fact, actually happened and what,
in fact, will happen. It adopts an ideal observer's eye view.
The permissibility of the husband's conduct, in Thomson's
example, is assessed by what, in fact, was the case and ig-
nores his intentions, ignorance, mistaken beliefs and per-
spective. That Vic did not intend to use force at the time
when I established that he was about to use force is irrele-
vant under Thomson's Irrelevance of Intention to Permis-
sibility thesis. That Vic is not at fault for either the villain-
ous attack or innocent threat and that VA, if not IT, is at
fault in initiating the need for force are all irrelevant under
Thomson's Irrelevance of Fault to Permissibility thesis.
That Vic was not committing any act or engaging in any
physical conduct that might give the appearance or indica-
tion that he was about to kill VA at the point I claim is ir-
relevant since Vic was, in fact, imminently about to kill VA
and force by VA against Vic was, in fact, necessary. Under
Thomson's strongly objective theory, the lack of appearance
or indication that another is about to kill another is irrele-
vant if the actor is, in fact, about to kill another. The
strangeness in saying that Vic was the first to be about to
use force, despite our sense that he did not initiate either
conflict, stems from the still remaining residue of using
fault, intention or belief as criteria of permissibility. From
the perspective of Vic and from the perspective of appear-
ances Vic was not about to use force at the time I estab-
lished, but from the perspective of an omniscient God's eye
view it is entirely proper to say that Vic was about to use
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force despite giving no sign that he would, his unawareness
that he would and his ignorance of an impending threat.
I believe that what underlies our traditional assumption
that someone like VA is the first to be about to use force is
that VA is the first actor who we have some evidence for
saying is about to use force.31 Although Vic is temporally
closer to using force than VA, we have grounds at an earlier
point in time for believing that VA is about to use force
than we have warrant for believing that Vic is about to use
force. But the actor who we first have grounds for saying is
about to use force is not necessarily the first actor who is, in
fact, about to use force. Under a strongly objective ap-
proach, the standard is not the first actor we may have
warrant for believing is about to use force, but the first ac-
tor who is, in fact, about to use force.
The following examples may alleviate some of the
strangeness of my interpretation of "about to," under a
strongly objective approach, as applied in the cases of Vil-
lainous Aggressor and Nozick's Innocent Threat.' Suppose
we are watching a hockey game and during a brief timeout
a fan confidently says that one of the teams, the New York
Rangers, is about to score. You might say to the fan that his
belief is unfounded considering there is no indication or
physical manifestation that anyone is about to score (play
has been briefly suspended for the duration of the timeout).
Yet if the Rangers, shortly after the conclusion of the time-
out, do suddenly score, you might claim that his assertion
was not epistemically justified or warranted while still
admitting that ontologically what occurred indicates that
31. Self-defense scenarios are typically set out as follows: A is about to kill V
and will do so unless stopped; V kills A. But suppose we alter the way the same
scenario is presented: V is about to kill A and will do so unless stopped; V kills A
before A can use force to save herself In the former depiction of the scenario we
naturally assume that A is the aggressor and V the defender. But in the latter
telling our intuitions may be unsettled because we no longer have the narrative
cue that the aggressor is the actor who we first become aware will use force. In
the latter presentation of the scenario we are less sure, I believe, as to which actor
is the wrongful aggressor and which is the innocent defender.
32. See NOZICK, supra note 26.
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his statement was true. A strongly objective theory is not
concerned with whether a well-founded reason exists for
believing that another is about to use force, but whether the
other, in fact, was about to use force. Thus merely because
there was no indication, appearance or epistemic basis for
stating, at T-5, that Vic, at T-5, is about to kill VA or IT
does not preclude Vic from being about to kill VA or IT at T-
5 under a strongly objective approach.
Let us consider another example. Suppose that bomb A
will explode at T5 and that bomb B will explode at T10.
Further suppose that we arbitrarily define when a bomb is
about to explode as ten units of time before it actually does
explode. If bomb A explodes at T5, then bomb A was about
to explode at T-5. When bomb A explodes at T5 and bomb B
has still not yet exploded, we may safely conclude that the
soonest bomb B may be said to be about to explode is some
time after T-5. Thus bomb A is the first (between bombs A
and B) to be about to explode. It is clear that for any two
bombs, the first bomb which, in fact, does explode is neces-
sarily the first bomb that is about to explode. Suppose we
do not arbitrarily define when a bomb is about to explode as
ten unspecified units of time before it actually does explode.
Even so, if bomb A explodes before bomb B explodes, bomb
A is nonetheless the first bomb to be about to explode.
May the above rule regarding which of two bombs is the
first to be about to explode be extended to determinations of
which of two human actors is the first to be about to kill?
Although there are certainly a myriad of differences be-
tween bombs and human beings, under Thomson's strongly
objective theory a number of the differences are treated as
irrelevant. An actor's intentions, beliefs and fault (or lack
thereof) are declared irrelevant. On what basis can the
above rule regarding which of two bombs is the first to be
about to explode be accepted while still denying that Vic, at
T-5, is the first to be about to kill IT and VA and thus the
33. Bomb B will explode at T1O unless the shock waves emanating from
bomb A exploding disrupt the triggering mechanism of bomb B thereby preventing
bomb B from exploding.
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first to be about to violate the others' right to life? Just as
the first bomb to, in fact, explode is necessarily the first
bomb which is about to explode, the first actor who does, in
fact, apply force is necessarily the first to be about to apply
force under a strongly objective theory. Perhaps about
to does not imply a temporal condition. Yet if about to does
not refer to a time period, however unquantified, what does
it refer to? Even if the phrase involves a time period per-
haps it involves something else as well. Maybe it cannot be
said that an actor is about to use force until he intends to
use force or is aware that he will use force. But this inter-
pretation involves a slide back into a subjective account and
is contradicted by Thomson's principle of the irrelevance of
intention. Perhaps an actor is not about to use force until
there is a physical appearance or manifestation that he will
use force. But appearances may be deceiving and are not
relevant to a theory which assesses the permissibility of
self-defense on what, in fact, occurred and not on what ap-
peared to be occurring.
Even if the phrase "about to," under a strongly objective
theory, does have a strict temporal meaning, perhaps
Thomson's theory could avoid the absurd consequences of
justifying the force of villainous aggressors by scrapping the
about to construct without falling back into a subjective ap-
proach. Instead of being about to violate another's right to
life and forfeiting one's own by being the first to be about to
kill, perhaps the new principle could be the first to actually
kill. Yet that standard would produce the same
(presumably) undesirable result of forfeiting, e.g., Vic's
right to life if Vic kills first.
Perhaps Thomson's theory could be amended such that
the first actor to exhibit an actual (not mistakenly per-
ceived) physical manifestation of being about to kill another
is the first to be about to violate the other's right to life and
thereby forfeits her own right to life. Both VA and IT exhib-
ited a physical manifestation of being about to kill Vic by
driving at Vic and falling toward Vic, respectively, prior to
Vic exhibiting a physical manifestation of being about to
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blow up VA and vaporizing IT. This amendment would
seem to yield the permissibility of Vic's force against IT and
VA, as Thomson intended, as well as avoiding the clearly
undesirable result of justifying VA's force against Vic. Let
us assume for the moment that a physical manifestation
requirement (PMR) does successfully prevent the counter-
intuitive result of justifying VA's aggression and forfeiting
the right to life of innocent Vic. I will argue that it nonethe-
less raises substantial difficulties for a strongly objective
theory sufficient to suggest the preferability of a subjective
approach. I will then argue that incorporating the PMR into
a strongly objective theory yields a paradox that may pre-
vent the PMR from preventing the counterintuitive results.
Requiring a physical manifestation seems more suited to
a subjective theory and is incompatible with a strongly ob-
jective theory. A PMR is plausible within a subjective the-
ory as evidence that an actor could honestly and/or rea-
sonably believe that self-defense force was necessary. Con-
sidering who first exhibited an external threat of physical
harm is useful to assess whether an actor's belief in an
imminent threat of harm is honestly held and/or reason-
able. A perceivable threat of harm is more persuasive than
a gut instinct to establish that an actor honestly believes,
reasonably believes or knows that he is about to be at-
tacked. Without some physical manifestation of an immi-
nent attack or threat we might plausibly doubt that the ac-
tor intended to use defensive force rather than aggressive
force. A prior physical manifestation might also serve to
identify who was at fault in initiating the need for the actor
to use self-defense force.
What would be the purpose of a PMR within a strongly
objective theory? Unlike within a subjective approach, the
actor is not required to act in response to, or because of, or
believe that force is justified because of a perceived physical
manifestation of harm. The actor need not even be aware of
the physical manifestation. Perhaps the purpose is that it
aids the fictive ideal observer of the strongly objective the-
ory. Yet the ideal observer focuses exclusively on whether
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one actor will, in fact, kill a second actor and if so, in fact,
when. The focus is not on whether there is a physical mani-
festation indicative of an actor being about to kill, but
whether an actor is, in fact, about to kill. The requirement
is neither an infallible indicator of whether nor when. An
actor may exhibit a physical manifestation a split second
before killing or hours before killing. Moreover, an actor
may exhibit a physical manifestation suggesting a forth-
coming attack and nonetheless not attack. Even if it is ar-
gued that the requirement is correct in most cases, the
strongly objective theory does not deal in likelihoods or
probabilities or well-founded reasons for belief but in certi-
tude. Moreover, why would the fictive ideal observer utilize
an unreliable guide much less need a guide at all? Under a
strongly objective theory either it is the case that an actor's
right to life is about to be violated or not. What difference
does it make whether the threat of harm is manifested
physically? Moreover, what difference does it make when
there is no requirement that the actor actually perceive it?
The PMR is an evidentiary device added ad hoc to an
approach which is concerned with ontologically if and when
an actor's right to life is, in fact, about to be violated. The
requirement of an externalized threat of harm is used as a
proxy for whether there is, in fact, a threat of harm. Incor-
porating that criterion into a strongly objective theory is
elevating the proxy over the underlying principle, elevating
epistemic justification over ontological truth. Since the
proxy can both be present when the underlying principle is
not and not present when the underlying principle is pres-
ent, the proxy imperfectly translates the underlying prin-
ciple. If and when an actor is about to kill, in fact, and if
and when self-defense force is necessary, in fact, is not in-
variably a function of when an externalized threat of harm
is present.
Yet without that ad hoc, unprincipled requirement, the
strongly objective theory yields the absurd consequence of
justifying villainous aggressors and forfeiting the lives of
innocents. It yields conclusions about a paradigm case of
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permissible self-defense diametrically opposite to our nearly
undisputed intuitions. Although incorporating the ad hoc,
unprincipled requirement avoids the absurd consequences,
it nonetheless subverts and distorts the strongly objective
theory of self-defense. It renders the strongly objective the-
ory no longer strongly objective. Yet an internally consis-
tent (i.e., without the PMR) strongly objective theory cannot
accommodate our intuitions, even in paradigm cases.
Even if the inclusion of the PMR did not succumb to the
difficulties demonstrated above and successfully avoided
the counterintuitive outcome of justifying VA's aggression,
some argument would need to be advanced as to why the
PMR is other than an ad hoc, unprincipled requirement. If
it was successful, clearly it would be useful in avoiding the
reductio ad absurdum of yielding results diametrically op-
posite to our nearly undisputed intuitions in paradigm
cases. But is there an independent rationale for the re-
quirement? George Fletcher argues that a "visible manifes-
tation of aggression"' by the aggressor or threat is neces-
sary as it "signals to the community that the defensive re-
sponse is not a form of aggression but a legitimate response
in the name of self-protection."' Given Fletcher's theory's
requirement that the actor know of the threat,' a physical
manifestation makes it more likely that at least the actor
claiming self-defense could have been aware of the threat.
As a "signal," the PMR serves an evidentiary function: force
could be permissible self-defense, but without such a signal
we would not know that its permissible self-defense. As a
result, force which objectively is permissible self-defense
but is not known to be permissible self-defense is, under the
PMR, impermissible self-defense. Regardless of whether
one ultimately finds Fletcher's view persuasive, it is at least
understandable that in a theory which requires that the
actor know of the threat that there be something of which
34. George Fletcher, Domination in the Theory of Justification and Excuse, 57
U. PITr. L. REv. 553-78 (1996).
35. Id. at 571.
36. See infra note 49, authorities cited therein, and accompanying text.
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the actor may have knowledgeY Fletcher further stresses
that the issue "properly falls into the domain of political
theory rather than moral theory."' But in Thomson's moral
theory of self-defense which disregards the mental states of
actors, a principled basis for the requirement seems to be
lacking.
In addition to being inconsistent with a strongly objec-
tive approach and unprincipled, the PMR is both underin-
clusive and overinclusive. To see how the PMR is overin-
clusive, let us suppose that one actor exhibits an actual (not
mistakenly perceived) physical manifestation that he is
about to kill a second actor (who has a right to life) thus
forfeiting the first actor's life and rendering force used
against the first actor permissible. But, in fact, the first ac-
tor would have changed his mind at the last second and not
have gone through with the attack that his physical mani-
festation suggested. Since he never would have killed the
second actor even if not stopped, he never would have vio-
lated the other actor's right to life. But under the PMR, for
example, A's physical manifestation of harm forfeits A's
right to life rendering B's force against A permissible.
Amending Thomson's theory to include the PMR would
justify self-defense in situations in which the defender's
right to life would never have been violated (even if the ap-
parent attacker was not stopped). Actors who never would
have violated another's right to life (even if not stopped)
could nonetheless be permissibly killed. Such a result is
antithetical to a strongly objective approach. Thomson
37. Not surprisingly, the two leading legal theorists who contend that self-
defense may be permissible or justified without regard to subjective factors or
mental states do not require a physical manifestation of harm in order for self-
defense to be permissible or necessary. See PAUL ROBINSON, 2 CRIMINAL LAW
DEFENSES 73-74, 76-79 (1984); GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW
504 (2d ed. 1983). For a critique of their strongly objective theories of legal
justification see Russell Christopher, Unknowing Justification and the Logical
Necessity of the Dadson Principle in Self-Defense, 15 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 229
(1995).
38. Fletcher, supra note 34, at 570. For Thomson's acknowledgement of the
moral theory/political theory distinction, in a different context, see Imposing
Risks, supra note 3, at 176.
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might properly respond to the overinclusiveness argument
by revising the PMR to the following: a physical manifesta-
tion that would, in fact, have led to the death of another if
not stopped.3'
Yet even after incorporating the revised requirement
(which defeats the overinclusiveness argument), Thomson's
amended theory is nonetheless underinclusive. Suppose an
evil aggressor, A, is a split second from killing innocent B
yet has not exhibited a physical manifestation of being
about to kill B. Under either version of the PMR, A is not
yet about to violate B's right to life and thus has not yet
forfeited his own right to life. Until A forfeits his right to
life, B may not permissibly kill A. Yet suppose that by the
time A does exhibit the requisite physical manifestation
rendering it permissible for B to kill A in self-defense, it is
too late for B to defend himself. B's life is in jeopardy from
A, A is (at least temporally) about to kill B and defensive
force is, in fact, immediately necessary for B to survive, but
under either PMR force used at that point would be im-
permissible. This would seem to be the sort of case that
Thomson's strongly objective theory would wish to permit B
to save himself and kill A.
The incorporation of either PMR also produces arbitrary
results. Consider the following hypothetical in which there
are two villainous aggressors. Suppose at T-5, A forms a
firm intention to murder B, who is driving down the road in
A's general direction, with his antitank gun. Because A can
kill B with only four seconds of preparation, he decides to
wait until B gets closer so that he won't miss. At TO, igno-
rant of A's intentions, B forms a firm intention to kill A as
soon as possible. But because he does not have his antitank
gun, all he can do is try to run A over with his truck. B
swerves into the other lane and starts driving at A. At T1, A
readies his antitank gun and at T5 A fires the gun thereby
killing B.
39. I am indebted to Kent Greenawalt for supplying this point.
SELF-DEFENSE AND OBJECTIVITY
Under Thomson's theory, amended to incorporate either
PMR, B is the first to be about to violate A's right to life at
TO by driving at A. A does not exhibit a physical manifesta-
tion of being about to kill B until T1. Thus A's force is per-
missible in self-defense and B's force is impermissible. A's
force is permissible, under Thomson's theory with either
PMR, only because A exhibits a physical manifestation to
be about to kill B subsequent to B's physical manifestation
despite A being the first to intend to kill the other. In this
hypothetical the permissibility of self-defense is a function
of which party has the speedier method of killing. If A's
method of killing B took longer to deploy and A exhibited a
physical manifestation to be about to kill B at T-1 instead of
T1, then it would be B's force that was permissible and A's
impermissible.
A theory which produces arbitrary results (justifying the
self-defense force of whichever actor has the quicker means
of killing at his disposal) is especially prone to manipula-
tion by knowledgeable criminals. One could plan to murder
anyone and have her conduct endorsed as permissible self-
defense as long as she made sure she killed her victim in
such situations in which her means of killing could be more
speedily employed than her victim. For example, suppose
that B has an antitank gun after all. B has the top of the
line model which only requires one second of preparation.
Instead of killing by driving at A, B can wait until after T1
when A exhibits a physical manifestation (thereby forfeiting
A's life), ready her gun at T2 and kill A at T3. Since A's
physical manifestation at T1 occurred prior to B's at T2, A
forfeits his right to life at T1 rendering B killing A permis-
sible self-defense.
Access to a speedier method of killing hardly seems to be
a principled basis for a theory to determine the permissibil-
ity or impermissibility of self-defense force. The incorpora-
tion of either PMR into Thomson's theory yields arbitrary
results. Whether A or B is entitled to be justified in self-
defense should not depend on which actor has the quicker
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means of killing at their disposal. Why would a theory of
self-defense favor the actor who can kill more quickly?
In addition to yielding arbitrary results, being subject to
manipulation and, being underinclusive of the sorts of in-
stances that Thomson would wish to permit the defender to
kill the aggressor, the amendment is incompatible with the
strongly objective account which Thomson employs. The
amendment really serves as an evidentiary proxy best
suited for a subjective theory.
VI.
Thus far we have been assuming that a PMR or
amended PMR successfully avoids the counterintuitive re-
sult of justifying VA's force and forfeiting the right to life of
innocent Vic. The subsequent issue has been whether the
PMR raises other problems. Yet incorporating the PMR or
amended PMR into the strongly objective theory yields a
paradox that may prevent it from successfully avoiding the
counterintuitive results.
Let us return to Thomson's case of Villainous Aggressor.
Under the PMR or amended PMR, the first actor (between
VA and Vic) to exhibit a physical manifestation is about to
violate the right to life of the other and that first actor is
subject to permissible force in self-defense from the other
actor since that first actor has forfeited his own right to life.
Since it seems that VA is the first to exhibit a physical
manifestation, Vic's force is justified and it seems that in-
clusion of a PMR yields the intuitively expected outcome.
Yet if we assume that VA, under Thomson's theory with
a PMR, is the first to exhibit a physical manifestation to be
about to kill the other and is about to violate Vic's right to
life rendering Vic's force permissible in self-defense, that
premise paradoxically generates a conclusion contradicting
the premise. To see the paradox, let us designate the point
in time at which VA forfeits his right to life (by exhibiting a
physical manifestation) and thereby force in self-defense
against VA is permissible as TO. Also, let us assume that
Vic cannot apply force against VA instantaneously (i.e.,
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without any time elapsing) and that all applications of force
necessarily entail a prior physical manifestation.' Thus in
order for Vic to do that which he may permissibly do (apply
lethal force to VA at TO),' he would necessarily have had to
exhibit a physical manifestation at some point in time prior
to his permissible application of force in self-defense at TO.
Since Vic exhibits a physical manifestation prior to TO and
VA's physical manifestation occurs at TO, it is Vic who is
the first to exhibit a physical manifestation of being about
to kill the other and Vic who is about to violate the right to
life of VA. Thus it is Vic who forfeits his right to life render-
ing VA's force permissible in self-defense and Vic's force
impermissible.
Perhaps this claim warrants further explanation. Since
our premise is that VA has lost his right to life at TO, it will
not violate VA's right to life to be killed (or sustain lethal
force) at TO. For example, if a bullet from Vic's gun enters
VA's skull at TO (or a fraction of a nanosecond after TO)'
that should be permissible since it does not violate VA's
right to life since VA has lost his right to life. Or, for exam-
ple, if Vic squeezes the trigger of his gun at TO which causes
a bullet to pierce VA's skull and kill him that should also be
permissible for the same reason. In either case, Vic would
have necessarily exhibited a physical manifestation (taking
the gun out, raising it, cocking it, aiming it etc.) of his
permissible force prior to TO. For example, in order for Vic
to pull the trigger at TO he would have had to do other acts
like taking the gun out, raising it etc., any of which might
constitute a physical manifestation, prior to TO.
40. If this is not the case then support for a PMR erodes-why would there be
the requirement in the first place?
41. Although Vic is not required to apply force at TO-he could do it at T5 as
in the previous discussion or T3, T7 etc.-nonetheless it is permissible for him to do
it at TO.
42. It is not necessary, in order for the paradox to arise, that VA's exhibition
of a physical manifestation and Vic's application of force occur simultaneously.
Vic's application of force could occur subsequent to TO as long as it was a
sufficiently short period of time thereafter such that the duration of any physical
movement of Vic's that would satisfy a PMR was of longer duration.
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The premise that Vic's force in self-defense is permissi-
ble, with which Thomson and nearly everyone would intui-
tively agree, yields the conclusion that Vic's force is im-
permissible and VA's conduct permissible. Thus in doing
what we assume Vic may permissibly do, under either
PMR, Vic exhibits a physical manifestation prior to VA's
physical manifestation at TO. As a result, it is Vic who is
the first to exhibit a physical manifestation and thus Vic
who is about to violate the right to life of VA and it is Vic
who forfeits his own right to life. It is VA's conduct which is
permissible and Vic's force that is impermissible. In other
words, by incorporating a PMR or amended PMR into
Thomson's strongly objective theory, in doing what is per-
missible an actor paradoxically does what is impermissible.
Inclusion of the PMR or amended PMR not only results in
the same counterintuitive outcome as the strongly objective
theory without a PMR, but it also produces a paradox: in
order to do what is permissible that which is permissible
becomes impermissible.
Of course, Thomson could avoid the paradox by scrap-
ping the PMR or amended PMR. Yet this would result in
the counterintuitive outcome of forfeiting Vic's right to life
and justifying VA's conduct, as discussed in section IV. The
PMR or amended PMR need not be abandoned, however, to
avoid the paradox. Thomson's theory could adopt an addi-
tional amendment. A waiting period after the aggressor or
threat has lost his right to life could be imposed before the
defender could use force. The waiting period would have to
be of sufficient duration such that the defender could not
exhibit a physical manifestation of his defensive force until
after the aggressor's or threat's physical manifestation. In
other words, even though force in self-defense is permissible
as soon as the aggressor or threat forfeits his right to life,
the defender must wait until some amount of time has
passed before using force in self-defense.
Although this waiting period amendment technically
circumvents the paradox, it is ad hoc, unprincipled and
lacking an independent rationale. If force in self-defense is
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permissible as soon as the aggressor or threat loses his
right to life, why would the defender need to wait? If the
aggressor or threat has already lost her right to life what
morally recognized interest of the aggressor is being served
by waiting? Is the aggressor's no longer existent right to life
being violated less by waiting?
The awkwardness of incorporating this amendment into
an objective theory should be contrasted with the concep-
tual ease in which (at least partially) agent-centered sub-
jective approaches naturally incorporate what functions as
a waiting period-reasonable belief or knowledge of the
justificatory circumstances. Under subjective approaches
which require some requisite mental state of the defender
claiming self-defense, the above paradox never arises be-
cause satisfying the requisite mental state acts as a func-
tional substitute for the ad hoc waiting period. Consider the
following example. A exhibits a physical manifestation of
being about to kill B. Unlike under Thomson's theory with a
PMR, force by B in self-defense is still not yet permissible
under an at least partially agent-centered approach. B must
form, for example, an honest or reasonable belief regarding,
or have knowledge of, A's physical manifestation before B's
force can be considered permissible. The time it takes B to
perceive and process B's physical manifestation before re-
sponding insures that B's physical manifestation will not
occur prior to A's. Therefore, it will not be the case under
such subjective approaches, that in doing what is permissi-
ble, the defender will do what is impermissible.
I believe that the latent paradox has been overlooked
because our shared conception of self-defense depends on an
at least partially subjective account. Perhaps even propo-
nents of an objective approach unwittingly or subcon-
sciously slide into or assume a subjective view which has
the effect of obscuring the paradox. Only by fully explicat-
ing the ramifications of an objective approach does the
paradox come to light. So ingrained in our intuitive under-
standing of self-defense is a subjective view that we natu-
rally assume what amounts to as a waiting period even in
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an objective approach which does not make allowance for
one.
Central to our shared understanding of self-defense, I
believe, is that the defender's force is a response to the
threatened harm of the aggressor or threat. In order for the
defender to respond, however, entails the defender having
some mental state of perception, belief, knowledge etc. in
regard to the threat posed. In treating such mental states
as irrelevant, an objective account obscures an essential
aspect of self-defense-that it be a response. Whereas an at
least partially agent-centered account affirmatively re-
quires some mental state which insures that the defender is
responding, an objective approach treats the defender's
force as if it was a response. The paradox discussed above
arises in the crack between requiring that the defender ac-
tually respond and treating the defender as if she re-
sponded.
VII.
Perhaps Thomson intended to employ not a strongly ob-
jective approach but rather a weakly objective' approach.
Under the latter approach, in cases in which the threat or
aggression is uncertain, conduct is impermissible if there is
a sufficiently high probability that the aggression or threat
posed will violate the right to life of another. Force in self-
defense is permissible against such sufficiently high prob-
ability, though not certain, aggression or threats. Would the
PMR incorporated into the weakly objective approach avoid
the difficulties caused by the inclusion of the requirement
in the strongly objective approach? The problems of arbi-
trariness, the paradox, underinclusiveness and overinclu-
siveness would still persist. Though undesirable, under
and overinclusiveness would not be as grave a problem for
an account that determines self-defense to be permissible
not in all cases in which, in fact, an actor's right to life is
43. See the discussion of the distinction between strongly and weakly
objective approaches, supra section II.
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about to be violated but only when it was of sufficiently
high probability. Under and overinclusiveness is inevitable
in such a probabilistic account.
Additional problems, however, remain. Is the physical
manifestation requirement an absolute indicator of suffi-
ciently high probability or is it merely one factor that goes
into the calculus of sufficiently high probability? If its only
one factor among many, then in a situation in which the
physical manifestation is not present but there was none-
theless a sufficiently high probability, then the weakly ob-
jective approach would have the same problem that the
strongly objective theory without the PMR incurred. It
would yield results in paradigm cases inapposite of our vir-
tually undisputed intuitions." On the other hand, if the
PMR is an absolute indicator, then in a situation in which
the requirement was satisfied but there was nonetheless
not a sufficiently high probability the requirement would
contradict the essence of the very approach (high probabil-
ity) of which it is but a part.
Perhaps incorporating the amended PMR (physical
manifestation that would, in fact, lead to the death of an-
other unless stopped) into the weakly objective theory
would surmount the above difficulties. Yet the requirement
of a physical manifestation leading to certain death unless
stopped is incompatible with an approach that involves only
uncertain, but high probability, violations of rights to life.
The most serious objection to the claim that Thomson
might have intended to employ only a weakly objective the-
ory is that such a theory is only applicable to cases of uncer-
tain harm or uncertain violations of rights to life. All of the
cases being discussed herein involve only certain harms or
violations. Moreover, Thomson herself only discusses in-
stances of certain threats and certain aggression in Self-
Defense. She explicitly points out that the problem of uncer-
tain threats and aggression is outside the scope of her arti-
cle. '
44. See supra section IV.
45. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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Perhaps Thomson intended neither a strongly objective
,nor weakly objective theory but rather a minimally objec-
tive account. The minimal condition for a theory to be ob-
jective, I take it, is that it exclude subjective criteria. Mi-
chael Gorr has provided the helpful term of "purely exter-
nalist"' for an account that excludes all internal aspects of
actors, i.e., mental states, but focuses on the actors' exter-
nal conduct. The advantage to Thomson of this approach is
that it could avoid the interpretation of about to as strictly
temporal. Unlike under a strongly objective theory, being
temporally the first to be about to kill would not necessarily
constitute being about to violate another's right to life. Only
some external, physical act or conduct of an actor could
make that actor be about to violate another's right to life.
Such a "purely externalist" account would feature some
type of PMR. Also unlike the strongly objective approach,
the inclusion of a PMR would not render the purely exter-
nalist account internally inconsistent.
Yet the other problems of the PMR, discussed above, in-
cluding the paradox, would still remain. The minimally ob-
jective or "purely externalist7 account fares no better than
the weakly objective theory. The next section will consider a
number of variations of subjective theories and will assess
whether they avoid the counterintuitive result of VA per-
missibly killing Vic discussed in section IV.
VIII.
Although there are any number of subjective theories
that could be considered, we will consider three. The first, a
target-centered account, takes into account subjective as-
pects of the actor who has conventionally been designated
the aggressor or threat, e.g., VA or IT. The second two, at
least partially agent-centered accounts, focus on subjective
characteristics of who we typically consider the defender.
Larry Alexander has criticized Thomson's theory, in
part, for its justifying force against moral, but causally
46. Michael Gorr, Private Defense, 9 LAW & PHIL. 254 n.28 (1990).
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harmful, innocents. 7 He questions why we should favor one
moral innocent, e.g., Vic over another, e.g., IT. Alexander
rejects Thomson's principle that every person has the right
not to be killed unless they are the first to be about to vio-
late another's right to life and instead proposes that every-
one has a right not, to be killed culpably.' Although it is
unclear whether Alexander's theory also incorporates the
latter portion of Thomson's principle, for the purposes of
ascertaining where Thomson's theory goes awry let us as-
sume that under Alexander's theory one's right is also
qualified by "unless they are the first to be about to violate
another person's right not to be killed culpably."
Alexander believes that one's right not to be killed cul-
pably is violated when the killer is aware or believes that
his conduct is wrongful. At the risk of oversimplification,
Alexander's right may reduce to that one has a right not to
be killed by non-innocent (evil or culpable) threats and ag-
gressors. Thus one lacks a right not to be killed by moral,
though causally harmful, innocents. For example, IT, fal-
ling toward Vic, is not culpably about to violate Vic's right
to life. Self-defense force by Vic against IT is impermissible
under Alexander's theory.
Let us now consider whether Vic may use self-defense
force against VA. At TO, VA is about to culpably violate
Vic's right to life unless Vic was already about to culpably
violate VA's life at T-5. Although Vic, at T-5 may have been
about to violate VA's right to life, he was not culpably about
to violate VA's right to life. Thus at TO, VA is the first to be
about to culpably violate the other's (Vic's) right to life and
VA thereby forfeits his right to life. Since Vic will otherwise
be killed by VA, and Vic is not about to culpably violate
VA's right to life because VA has already forfeited it (and
Vic is not culpable), self-defense force by Vic is permissible.
47. Alexander, supra note 2, at 60-62.
48. Id. at 60.
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Like Thomson's and Alexander's theories, Fletcher's the-
ory' requires that an actor, in order for her force to be
permissible in self-defense, face an objectively actual
threat. A mistaken belief, even if reasonable, that aggres-
sion is imminent does not suffice. Yet unlike Thomson's
strongly objective theory, Fletcher adds the (subjective) re-
quirement that the actor have knowledge of the justifica-
tory circumstances or act with justificatory purpose. Does
Fletcher's theory avoid the reductio ad absurdum of justify-
ing VA's force against Vic? Since VA acts with villainous
intent rather than with justificatory purpose, VA's force
would be unjustified; since Vic correctly perceives VA's
threat and acts with justificatory purpose, Vic's force would
be justified. The inclusion of a subjective component in
Fletcher's theory prevents the (presumably) absurd result
of justifying the villainous aggressor against the innocent
defender.
A third (at least partially) subjective theory requires, in
order for an actor to be justified in self-defense, that she
reasonably believe that her force is necessary against an
unjustified threat.' Would Vic be justified against VA un-
der Thomson's theory with this reasonable belief amend-
ment? Seeing VA driving at him to run him over and kill
him, Vic might believe that force was necessary in self-
defense. Vic might also believe that VA's threat is unjusti-
fied since Vic realizes that he has done nothing to provoke
49. Fletcher's theory of justification can be found in, among other works,
GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINIG CRIMINAL LAw 552-79, 759-875 (1978); George
Fletcher, The Nature of Justification, in ACTION AND VALUE IN CRIMINAL LAW 175
(Stephen Shute et al. eds., 1993); The Right Deed for the Wrong Reason, 23 UCLA
L. REV. 293 (1975).
50. This approach to justified self-defense is embodied in the influential
Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute. MODEL PENAL CODE AND
COMMENTARIES § 3.04 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985). Support for
this account can be found in Russell Christopher, Mistake of Fact in the Objective
Theory of Justification: Do Two Rights Make Two Wrongs Make Two Rights...?, 85
J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 295 (1994); Joshua Dressier, New Thoughts About the
Concept of Justification in Criminal Law: A Critique of Fletcherls Thinking and
Rethinking, 32 UCLA L. REV. 61 (1984); Kent Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders
of Justification and Excuse, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1897 (1984).
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VA and it is not he but rather VA who is at fault in initiat-
ing the confrontation. If Vic's beliefs are reasonable, he
would be justified in self-defense. Even if we supposed that
VA honestly believed that driving at Vic to run him over
and kill him was necessary in self-defense and that Vic con-
stituted an unjustifiable threat, VA would lack reasonable
grounds for his belief. Like Alexander's and Fletcher's
theories, the Model Penal Code's account of justifiable self-
defense avoids the counterintuitive outcome of rendering
Vic's force impermissible and VA's force permissible.
Under neither of the three above (at least partially)
subjective theories would VA's aggression be permissible
and Vic's force impermissible. This suggests that the fea-
ture of Thomson's theory producing the unfortunate result
of a villainous aggressor being justified against a moral in-
nocent is the lack of consideration of subjective factors.
If the three (at least partially) subjective theories incor-
porated either version of the PMR only the (at least par-
tially) agent-centered subjective theories would avoid the
paradox discussed in section VI. Target-centered accounts,
which do not require any particular mental state of the de-
fender asserting a self-defense justification, incorporating
some variant of a PMR, would incur the paradox.51
CONCLUSION
Although we may all agree (on an intuitive level) in a
paradigm case such as that of Villainous Aggressor that
VA's conduct is impermissible and Vies conduct is permis-
sible self-defense, the theoretical challenge is to devise a
theory which yields the same conclusion as our nearly un-
disputed intuitions. The essence of permissible self-defense
is that it is a response to a previous impermissible threat of
harm. Yet in order for the force employed in self-defense to
successfully prevent the threatened harm from actually oc-
curring it must, at least in some cases, be employed prior to
51. It is unclear whether Alexander's target-centered theory includes some
type of PMR.
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the fruition of the threatened harm. The difficulty lies in
identifying which force is defensive and which is aggressive
in such cases when what we intuit to be the defensive force
is employed first. Any viable theory of self-defense must be
able to account for why the initial application of force is not
impermissible aggression but rather permissible self-
defense.
Thomson's theory of self-defense, embedded in a strongly
objective account, allows the condition for identifying the
impermissible aggressor (the first to be about to violate the
right to life of another) to be interpreted as strictly tempo-
ral. Since who we intuit to be the innocent defender is, in
some cases, temporally closer to killing than the aggressor
or threat, the innocent defender is the first to be about to
violate the right to life of the wrongful aggressor. Contrary
to our intuitions and Thomson's conclusions, the innocent
defender's conduct is deemed impermissible and the wrong-
ful aggressor's force impermissible. To avoid the strictly
temporal interpretation of "about to" resulting in a reversal
of our intuitions, about to must be interpreted as (or Thom-
son's theory amended to include) some type of PMR. Yet
inclusion of a PMR is inconsistent with the strongly objec-
tive approach; the problem of underinclusiveness and the
evidentiary nature of a PMR renders the strongly objective
account no longer strongly objective. Inclusion of a PMR
would be less problematic, however, with either a weakly
objective or "purely externalist" theory, but any type of
PMR in an objective account results in the paradox in
which what is permissible is impermissible. The paradox
may be technically circumvented by a requirement of a
waiting period, but the requirement lacks any satisfactory
independent rationale. Unless a principled basis for the
waiting period amendment can be supplied, Thomson's the-
ory can only provide a satisfactory account of self-defense
by including subjective criteria.
A subjective account assesses some mental state of one
or more of the combatants. In determining which party was
the wrongful aggressor and which the innocent defender, it
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inquires into the beliefs, intentions or states of knowledge
of the actors. In the case of Villainous Aggressor, Vic can
point to his (reasonable) belief that he perceived that VA
was about to kill him and he had no intention to kill VA
until after he perceived VA's attack. VA neither believed
nor could he reasonably believe that Vic intended to harm
him until after he commenced his attack on Vic. Despite Vic
being the one to use force first and being (at least tempo-
rally) about to use force first, a subjective theory can easily
distinguish between the conduct of the aggressor and the
innocent defender by examining the beliefs,intentions or
other mental states of the actors. A strongly objective the-
ory, on the other hand, fails to successfully distinguish
threats/aggressors from innocent defenders.
Any objective account must distinguish the impermissi-
ble threat or aggression from the permissible self-defense to
which it is in response without recourse to subjective fac-
tors such as belief, intention or knowledge. It must identify
some asymmetry or some type of act, conduct or state of
affairs regarding who we intuit to be the aggressor as con-
stituting the initial or first impermissibility.
Other than subjective factors, the possible candidates
are unsatisfactory. The first application of force is not vi-
able because who we intuit to be the innocent defender may
well be the first to apply force. The first actor to be about to
use force, if interpreted strictly temporally, is necessarily
the first actor to actually use force. Since the first actor to
actually use force may well be who we intuit to be the inno-
cent defender, the state of affairs of being the first to be
about to use force also fails. The first physical manifesta-
tion of harm or the amended PMR, in addition to a host of
other problems, yields the paradox of if the defender's con-
duct is permissible then its impermissible. What other
candidates remain for identifying some conduct or aspect of
who we intuit to be the aggressor or threat in paradigm
cases as the first or initial impermissibility? What asymme-
try (with a principled rationale) allows us to distinguish
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between the impermissible threat or aggressor and the
permissible self-defense of the defender under an objective
account?
It would seem that our traditional conception of self-
defense can only be accounted for by resort to one or more
subjective criteria. An objective account of self-defense ap-
pears to be suspect."
52. Since canvassing every extant formulation of an objective theory of self-
defense is outside the scope of this article, I have not demonstrated that all
objective accounts are problematic. I would merely like to suggest that in light of
the difficulties raised it is worth entertaining the possibility that any principled
objective account will fail to yield results compatible with our intuitions in
paradigm cases.
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